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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FAC '* 
Appellee's/Pioneer Roofing's paragraph # 2 indicates th;r 
Creekside a bill for $ M K{HH\ (><i \A Inlr iliis is inic. i( ignores that fact that Creekside paid 
,n| i U | ( j l l H ) l i a | $5?000. This is why the complaint requested$25,906 in damages and not 
$30,906. TR2. 
Appellee's/Pioneer Roofing's paragraph // K asseiis iiuii \ rcekside did nut respond 
to Pioneer's settlement offer, yet u ^ n ,7,-.• md mailed settlement documents on 
November 19, 2002, as noted in its billing record (TR 678 1j 35) and Creekside's attorney 
spoke with Pioneer's attorney on December 2, 2002. (TR 696) Moreover, Pioneer's 
counsel Rick Sorensen indicated by affidavit th.it setflenienf discussions did occur 
between September 2002 in ill lm\m\ 2003. TR 119 f^ 6, 129 If 5. This evidence in the 
records demonstrates that more occurred than is represented by Pioneer. 
Appellee's/Pioneer Roofing's paragraph #19 provides Judge Litldberg's 
justification for her grant of Creekside's JMuinn n > Ret use < "reekside respects this 
'explanation,, l>ui n < mid iinlteaie thai, given that the Motion was granted, the Judge's 
palliative comments are dicta. Moreover, Creekside reiterates that its Motion was made 
in good faith. Whether or not this court or Judge Lindberg concedes that the allegations 
made in the motion are true, n is ai iliis lime irrelevant, and therefore, the delay caused 
thereby si Creekside. Undue delay should not be ascribed to successful 
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litigation motions. 
Appellee's/Pioneer Roofing's paragraph #20 asserts that it was "ordered" to 
respond to Creekside's Motion to Extend. This is incorrect. It was allowed to Respond 
after the deadline to do so had passed. TR 315-317. 
RESPONSE TO PIONEER'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
AND ARGUMENT 
Pioneer argued that its, "honesty is not at issue/9 in these proceedings. It went on 
to argue: 
Creekside is not entitled to discovery regarding Pioneer Roofing's honesty unless 
Pioneer Roofing's honesty is at issue in this pending matter. Rule 608 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides that 'evidence of truthful character is admissible only 
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or 
reputation evidence or otherwise.' Creekside has not attacked Pioneer Roofing's 
character for truthfulness." 
This statement is illogical and erroneous for two reasons. First, the honesty of 
Pioneer Roofing or its alter ego and owner, John Stout, was at issue when the case was 
filed and especially the moment John Stout took the stand to testify. He in fact did testify. 
It cannot be reasonably disputed that he testified about matters that were in direct 
contravention with the testimony of many of Creekside's witnesses. Secondly, had 
Creekside been allowed to engage in discovery that uncovered evidence of Pioneer 
Roofing's character for untruthfulness, it would have attacked its character and then 
Pioneer could have presented evidence of truthful character pursuant to Rule 608. 
In Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746 (Utah 1997) the 
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Utah Court of Appeals stated thai Kulc: 
608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 'bias, prejudice or any motive 
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the 
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.' Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 78-24-1 
(1996), states that in every case),] the credibility of the witness may be drawn 
into question, by the manner in which he [or she] testifies, by the character of 
his [or her] testimony, or by evidence affecting his [or her] character for 
truth, honesty or integrity, or by his [or her] motives, or by contradictory 
evidence, Utah case law supports the well established principle that testimony 
reflecting on the bias and motives of a witness is admissible at trial. (Emphasis 
added, citations omitted.) 
Again, parties to lawsuits should always be allowed to engage in discovery Ilia) is 
reasonably calculated to lead to relevant *• vuleiice K i\ i• icst mj nil<irmation in discovery 
thai ma\ impugn <i IidjianLs 'honesty or the honesty of its agents and witnesses is always 
relevant to any dispute. 
Next Pioneer in pages 15 -16 of its brief addresses an issue not i aisecl in 
Creekside's appellate brief regarding l'reekside\ requested interrogatories 6 and 7. 
'h'XHK'i i ,i« pjics, kk( reekside refused to allow discovery . . . within the 240 days 
after the first answer," was filed. It then goes on to detail alleged conversations between 
counsels that have never been a part of the record, II ,I'IM» ,K y ues thai \ reck side .il >i » 
failed to conduct its di,sn >\vi v in a I inidv irmimu, stating, "When its time had run, it filed 
(\\ 11 motions to extend the discovery deadlines, but failed to submit either motions to the 
trial court for decision." 
As demonstrated in Creekside's Appellain Mm f n consisienih prosecuted the case 
up and uniil subnnM«Mj» discovcrv lo Pioneer; It was then Pioneer that failed to submit 
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timely responses to discovery. This in and of itself was most likely an undue 
manipulation of the circumstances to create the argument that it now makes here of undue 
delay. When it finally responded to discovery, it interjected numerous objections. By the 
time those objections were determined, the discovery deadlines had passed. 
Creekside then moved to extend the deadlines. During the same period of time the 
first trial judge was recused and there was no judge for a period of time so that Creekside 
could notice up its Motions to Extend. It is therefore disingenuous to argue that 
Creekside "refused" to complete discovery, and that Creekside failed to submit its 
motions. 
Pioneer further states that, "Settlement was not a matter of negotiating back-and-
forth as typically occurs in litigation. Pioneer Roofing made the offer to settle and 
Creekside simply refused to respond to the settlement offer until December 27, 2002." 
Aside from the fact that the citation to the record does not indicate this, this assertion is a 
mischaracterization of what occurred. Although not memorialized by letter or in the 
parties' fee petitions, there were in fact several conversations between counsels regarding 
the outstanding discovery and the ongoing settlement negotiations. TR 146-147. 
This is highlighted by Pioneer's counsel's own attorney fees billing records 
charging Pioneer for the preparation of settlement documents. TR 678 ^[35. Moreover, 
in response to Creekside9s Motion to Compel Discovery, Pioneer's counsel, by affidavit, 
also asserted that Pioneer's excuse for its failure to file timely discovery responses was 
4 
IHXIHIU, "hrlwem Sqifniibni I l„ ..'"('Nl."" m I In i-in, 100] ffic anies s.-nchi lo ocii.it,
 u*w 
issi les between, the parties, but were unable to do so.v 111 119 *, o, Hi- \ :\ l h ' - : 
consistent with Creekside's appellate argument and Pioneer is disingenuous to now argue 
the contrary on appeal 
Regarding lln disiovriv ml nl'l honrei surests llifil disrnverv rould have been 
conducted between the discovery cut off deadline and Pioneer's filing of its certificate of 
readiness for trial. Pioneer further suggests that Creekside never redraiied its uiscovery 
requests. I hese statements are erroneoi.- n 
M i l l i o n (in in P r n i i M l n r t i n i n fiiinl P i - * t ^
 n forerefiiscu iu * ntwe - * additional 
discovery. TR 164. Second, Creekside did redraft its discovery requests and mailed them 
to Pioneer on May 5, 2003. TR 289-290. Pioneer even acknowledge receiving them,, as 
noted in the i rial Record al page J')V in '"'itina i \ Requests lui Slalus ('onferenn1 "fi 
chilli Pioneer indicates, "since thai time Defendant has filed . . . Defendant's Seconu Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff " 
Pioneer also argues that Creekside failed to maH I ill evidence in suppoi I < I ih •• 
1 ri.il" 1. mi l l i ( r Jinj . 's MV a l l . t n u V s (v\ • "I Y i v k s i d t is fami l ia l w i t h Hit* r e q u i r e m e n t t o 
marshal the evidence when attacking a jury verdict as contrary io the evidence. The logic 
behind this requirement is that unlike a judge, a jury does not make i 
then conclusions oJ law that can be scrutinized will it nil it u * 
proceeding In lliis i »tv 111".' Irn-il judge's findings and conclusions of law are contained 
in his decision and may be thoroughly reviewed by the appellate court. As appropriately 
pointed out by Creekside9s appellate brief, the trial court's findings and conclusions 
standing alone demonstrate that an abuse of discretion did occur. 
Pioneer next argues that Creekside's Motions to Recuse were untimely and 
therefore it had to respond to them. This ignores the fact that such Motions do not require 
nor allow a responsive pleading. Moreover, it ignores the fact that Judge Lindberg's 
conduct was ongoing and that the Motions were eventually successful. One further 
example of Pioneer's excessive filings is its Motion For Order of Preclusion that was not 
submitted for decision because it had no merit. It is contained in the Trial Record at 
pages 354-442. It almost would appear that it was filed on the eve of trial so the 
Defendant could not focus its attention on preparing for trial. 
In regards to Creekside's request for invoices through discovery, Pioneer asserts, 
"Obviously Creekside could have obtained the invoices through discovery by 
subpoenaing the invoices directly from the supplier but failed to do so." This is a curious 
argument. Creekside could not have done this because it was unable to conduct discovery 
to determine and identify the suppliers where Pioneer had purchased it supplies. 
Therefore, obviously Creekside could not have obtained any invoices through subpoena 
because of Pioneer's failure to respond to discovery. 
Lastly, in regards to Pioneer's allegations of professional misconduct, Creekside's 
counsel would indicate the following. Creekside's counsel does recall being upset with 
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Pioneer's discovery delays and vended llns t onversalHm in lli< I m l I(n nnl a! pages 
in ill) in il i' liKii Nil S lUMiiMiin mi iid lint umversation. Pioneer's representation is 
hyperbole, However, Creekside's euun„ :_es recall OIK: occasion H*; which he raised his 
voice with opposing counsel during a telephone conversation ins conversation occurred 
?f r» ti-iK-when < - v ^ .,«. . - . \\ >can n fa piiinfiil 
• .'*!*..••!: sc. l l n s occurred aiici the Christmas holidays in 
January and February of 2004. The lump was later shown to be benign, This caused a 
considerable backlog and Creeksidc's counsel requester a continuance and r i u : : ^ • 
counr.cih rciused to gni:- • *> * * • * ] ' ' ^ d 
L \iv- v - additional a t torneys fees i*^ -*Pn<j -< forma; continuance and Pioneer 
responded, Pioneer 's counsel apologized for nol granting a continuance. (TR, 626-1)31) 
If this is an issue that would prevent this Cowl ironi addressing Hie sukslanl ul 
issues ill llns appeal, Liveksidt \ tniiirirl would iTspectfulh .••-- - •i •-, ne be a l lowedlo 
submit his medical documentation and to address the issue in a more appropriate ethii il 
proceeding before the bar. Therefore, perhaps Pioneer 's counsel should be directed U» hie 
a bar complaint. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In conclusion, it is respectfully requested that the Trial Court be found to have 
abused its discretion in not compelling discovery, not extending the discovers, deadlines 
and (hen in awarding all allomey\s lees hilled l\\ Phipid't. 'K m,;* prevailing pa rk 
Dated: 
'N- w 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC 
L-^fet)ren M. baifibert 
Attorney for Appellant 
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